Abstract: Spanning network games, which are a generalization of minimum cost spanning tree games, were introduced by Granot and Maschler (1991), who showed that these games are always monotonic. In this paper a subclass of spanning network games is introduced, namely simplex games, and it is shown that every monotonic game is a simplex game. Hence, the class of spanning network games coincides with the class of monotonic games.
I Introduction
Cooperative game theory often models classes of 'interactive situations', where this term may have different interpretations. In such cases, it is important to identify the class of the mathematical models, namely the class of games that corresponds to the class of interactive situations. For example, von Neumann and Morgenstern (1944) modeled the class of 'interactive situations' that fall under the category of strategic form games in an environment of transferable utility and full and unrestricted cooperation as a class of TU-cooperative games. They proved (in both directions) that the corresponding games constitute precisely the class of superadditive TU-games. Borm and Tijs (1992) showed that the class of strategic form games in a non-transferable utility setting where players are allowed to coordinate their actions corresponds to the class of superadditive NTU-cooperative games that satisfy the requirement of standardness. As another example, the class of weighted majority constant sum games was identified in Peleg (1968) as a class of simple TU-games satisfying certain Bondareva-Shapley conditions. The class of exchange economies in a transferable utility environment, for example, was modeled and identified in Shapley and Shubik (1969) as the class of totally balanced games. Kalai and Zemel (1982) showed that the class of flows with private ownership corresponds to the class of non-negative totally balanced games. Curiel, Derks and Tijs (1989) showed that the class of flows, where the arcs are controlled by coalitions with veto players corresponds to the class of non-negative balanced games. Such identification is not always complete. For example, Curiel, Maschler and Tijs (1987) showed that bankruptcy situations give rise to non-negative convex games, but they also showed that not every non-negative convex game can be derived from a bankruptcy situation.
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One reason why such identification is important is, because it enables one to decide whether a certain solution concept is appropriate to the corresponding situation. For example, if the interactive situations correspond to the class of simple games, then it makes no sense to recommend the Shapley value on the basis of Shapley's (1953) original axioms, because the sum of simple games, which appears in one of the axioms, is not a simple game and therefore the system is not meaningful when restricted to that class. In fact, Dubey (1975) showed that another set of axioms, which does make sense in the restricted class of simple games, is sufficient to characterize the Shapley value. Now, if one wants to recommend and justify a solution for a class of interactive situations that corresponds to the class of simple games, one can refer to Dubey's axioms and check if they are appealing in the actual case under consideration.
The present paper is concerned with the identification of the class of TU-games that correspond to a class of spanning network enterprises. This class (see section 2) was defined by Granot and Maschler (1991) and it generalizes Megiddo's (1978) spanning tree and the more general Granot and Huberman (1981) monotonic minimal spanning network enterprises. Granot and Maschler (1991) prove that the games that result from these enterprises are monotonic. Here we shall, in reply to a question that was raised by Pradeep Dubey, prove that the converse is also true: for every monotonic TU-game (N, v), there is a spanning network enterprise whose game is (N, v).
In section 2 we formally introduce the model of a spanning network enterprise and its corresponding spanning network game. Further, some properties of spanning network games are investigated in this section. In section 3 a subclass of spanning network games, the class of so-called simplex games, is introduced and our main result is proved, namely that every monotonic game is a simplex game.
Spanning Network Games
A spanning network enterprise is a structure ~:=(V, E, a, b, N), where (V, E) is a finite undirected graph containing a distinguished vertex, 0, called the root or the central supplier. We assume that the graph (V, E) is connected. Further, a is a function from E to IR that associates with each edge e~E a cost a(e), and b is a function from V to IR associating with each vertex v~ V a cost b (v) . Note that both a and b can also assign negative values, in which case they represent profits rather than costs. In addition, N= {1 ..... n} is a set of players. Each player is located in a vertex v~ V. Vertices, other than the root, that are not inhabited by players will be called switch boxes. Note that we do not exclude the possibility that several players are located in the same vertex, neither did we exclude the possibility that the root is inhabited.
The players are users of some good that can be provided by the central supplier.
Hence, the players in a coalition SC_N want to build a network that connects them to the root. Moreover, they want to do this in a cheapest possible way. Now, it is important to note that players are only located in vertices, they do not own them
